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I am going to offer some sketchy suggestions as to how
much and what sorts of freedom we in America have actually
had or sought in the past, how the matter stands today, and
what we intend or are likely to be able to do about it in the
near future.
When we talk of freedom in this country I believe we
usually have in mind (if I may be very elementary about it)
all or some of such liberties as the following: (i) the right,
and the actual opportunity, in some reasonable measure, to
participate in the choice and control of important governing
officials; (2) certain rights of acquiring, holding, and alienating
property, entering into contracts, and choosing and quitting
jobs; (3) rights not to be arrested or searched unreasonably,
and not to be punished or held civilly liable except under the
law and through an open, regular, and fair judicial procedure;
(4) the right not to be compelled to contribute to the support
of any church and the right to join any church, follow any
sort of religious ritual; the right to hold any political, social,
or economic opinions and to try to persuade others to accept
them, by publishing the opinions and demonstrating in behalf
of them-in mass meetings, parades, picket lines, etc.
We have never regarded any of these liberties as absolute.
No one claims that every citizen has the right to vote; even
the most conservative capitalist admits that there are valid
limits on his property rights; there are offenses and disputes
for which there is no right of jury trial, and there are condi-
tions under which there can be no demand for a speedy and
public trial; we compel even disbelievers to contribute to the
support of religious services, such as those of chaplains in the
army and navy, and in Congress; and we punish blasphemous,
* A lecture delivered at the Ohio State University May 13, 1941.
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obscene, libellous, and seditious utterances. These limitations
on freedom are taken for granted, ordinarily accepted without
protest even by the most liberal-minded among us, as restraints
necessary, even in the freest communities, for the maintenance
of a decent, orderly, peaceable, and fair-dealing civic life.
Even under such limitations we are left with a wide range of
freedom, so that we say that we still have democracy, free
enterprise, a free and fair judicial system, and religious free-
dom and freedom of the press and assembly. Often, however,
there have been, even in this free country, restraints that have
seemed, to many honest, public-spirited, and law-abiding citi-
zens, to be unnecessary for the preservation of public order and
fair dealing. We have a grand American tradition of equality
and toleration; but we also have a tradition of discrimination
and intolerance. Let us take a look briefly back on our history.
I.
Let us begin at the beginning. The first settlers of America
came over under the impulsion of a desire to escape restraints
of one sort or another. Most of the settlers in the Northern
and Central colonies, and later in the South, were members
of dissenting sects: Separatists, Puritans, Quakers, Presbyter-
ians, Anabaptists, Seven-day Baptists, Dunkers, Moravians,
Pietists. Many of these sects had arisen as adherents of a great
new idea of spiritual freedom-of regeneration and salvation
for the individual through an experience of his own inner
spirit, uncontrolled by decisions or judgments of ecclesiastical
officials above him; and they had new ideas on church organiza-
tion and ritual. They were not being allowed to follow these
ideas in their home countries. So they got permission to come
to the New World, where they might worship, preach, and
teach as they wished. In that sense then we can say that a
search for freedom of religion was a dominant motive in the
original settlement of our country. Settlers in all the colonies
were also seeking economic freedom. Many of them had been
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finding it hard to earn a living in England. John Winthrop,
first Governor of Massachusetts Bay, who had been a country
squire in England, wrote, just before he sailed for America,
that "means are so shortened" that no man is "able to continue
in that place and employment where he now iss," adding the
paradoxical statement that "no man's estate will suffice to keepe
sail with his 'equalls.' "
I doubt if it can be said that the settlers were in search of
political democracy. They had had little experience with that
sort of government at home and had not given much thought
to the matter. When they drew up plans of government in
America they generally fixed religious and property qualifica-
tions that excluded most adults, male or female, from political
power. As to rights before the courts and law-enforcing officers,
the record is not dear. But there were obstacles in the way of a
"government of laws" in seventeenth-century America. In the
first place, there were no lawyers. In the second place, judges,
governors, preachers, and teachers had then, as now, confused
and vacillating ideas as to what the law was that should govern
instead of men. Sometimes they proclaimed the Bible as the
supreme law, for civil life as well as the church. Sometimes
they maintained that rules of the English common law pre-
vailed here just as in England. Sometimes they asserted that
the ultimate governance of law was to be found in a recogni-
tion of the force of universally binding rules of reason and
justice-known, although not always obeyed, by all normally
reasonable men. Occasionally colonial magistrates claimed the
right to decide questions, even in criminal and civil litigation,
according to their own ideas as to what was right.
It can hardly be said that economic life in America began
with what we would call a system of free individual enterprise.
The original settlements were made by groups, not by individ-
uals. Colonial economic life began generally as a community
enterprise and remained such, in many respects, for a long time.
Thus in Massachusetts the original title to the lands on which
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the colonists were to settle was invested in a company. The
company later delegated the lands not to individuals but
to groups-the towns. When the towns made allotments to
individuals, they not only restricted the individual's right of
alienation but also held on to considerable areas for common
use. Moreover, both town authorities and the colonial legis-
latures intervened actively in economic life, regulating wages,
prices, and other market practices, and carrying on directly
various public economic and cultural enterprises. I fear the
records show that the governments of Massachusetts Bay and
some other colonies were what we now call "bureaucracies."
Many of the earliest regulations and aids were soon abandoned;
but many were long retained and at no time in the colonial
period was there a widely prevalent belief that there was any-
thing dangerous or impractical in a system of governmental
control of economic affairs.
Indeed we cannot say that there was a prevalent aim to
establish freedom of religion in colonial America. Those who
came to be free to worship as they saw fit did not come in
order to enable others to do the same. Most of the colonies,
North and South, maintained churches supported by public
taxation. In some of the colonies persons were fined, or
whipped, or imprisoned, or mutilated, or banished, or even
hanged, for openly advocating, in an orderly manner, unortho-
dox religious beliefs and practices.
This is not debunking our Puritan forefathers. Indeed,
any contrary description of them would be debunking them,
for it would be representing them as doing what they said they
believed it was wrong to do. Winthrop said he considered
democracy to be "the meanest and worst of all formes of Gov-
ernment . . . of least continuance and fullest of troubles," not
ordained by God as fit "eyther for church or commonwealth."
"God Almightie in his most holy and wise providence hath
soe disposed of the Condicion of mankinde, as in all times some
must be rich some poore, some highe and eminent in power
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and dignitie; others meane and in subieccion." Queried John
Cotton: "If the people be governors, who shall be governed?"
These Puritan leaders preached the supreme necessity of
authority, hierarchy, differentiation in function and rank. "Per-
sons of differing endowments and qualifications," said Pastor
William Hubbard, "need differing stations to be disposed
into"; "the greatest part of mankind are but as tools and
Instruments for others to work by, rather than any proper
Agents to effect any thing of themselves." They regarded
tolerance as a teaching of the devil. In a sense it may be said
that Puritans and some others came to America to escape from
a system of toleration. "I lived in a City," said Nathaniel
Ward (author of the Massachusetts "Body of Liberties"),
where a Papist Preached in one Church, a Lutheran in another,
a Calvinist in a third; . . . the Religion of that place was
but motly and meagre, their affections Leopard-like." "He
that is willing to tolerate any Religion, or discrepant way of
Religion, besides his owne, . . . either doubts of his owne, or
is not sincere in it."
The Puritans were able, strong-willed, public-spirited men,
honestly concerned with discharging a mission. They had, said
one of them, "transported themselves, with their whole fam-
ilies and interests, into the desarts of America, that they might
here peaceably erect Congregational Churches." Said another:
"Necessity may presse some; Novelties draw on others; hopes
of gaine in time to come may prevaile with a third sort ; but
that the most and most sincere and godly part have the
advancement of the Gospel for their maine scope I am confi-
dent." If others did not accept the Gospel according to the
Puritan interpretation, they could go somewhere else. Ward
said he wanted to "proclaime to the world, in the name of
our Colony, that all Familists, Antinomians, Anabaptists, and
other Enthusiasts, shall have free Liberty to keep away from
us, and such as will come to be gone as fast as they can, the
sooner the better."
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This, of course, is not the whole story of the origins of
our civic traditions. Doubts of the validity of the Puritan
authoritarianism appeared at times in the minds or hearts of
even the most orthodox leaders. John Cotton, autocratic but
benign, admitted that liberty, in moderate amounts, should be
spread a little more widely. Governor Winthrop, one of the
few non-clerics among the Puritan leaders, on several occa-
sions protested against what seemed to him the clergy's too
insatiable demands for conformity. And when, during his last
illness, Deputy-Governor Dudley came to Winthrop's bedside,
bearing an order to banish another heretic, the Governor refused
to sign the order, saying that "he had done too much of that
work already." More effective opposition came from those who
had more positive and constant desires to create a free and
tolerant society in America. Roger Williams, Puritan pastor
at Salem, whom Cotton Mather later likened to "a certain
windmill . . . whirling round with extraordinary violence,"
frankly attacked the Massachusetts system, contending that
civil government had no rightful power to enforce religious
conformity and that governors, in church or state, had no right
to govern without consulting more freely the opinions of those
whom they governed. Since the leaders feared that the whole
country was "like to be set on fire" by the windmill, Williams
had to move to another region. In "Providence Plantations"
he made a genuine effort to establish a democratic constitution,
separate church and state, and treat all persons alike, regard-
less of creed, rank, or race; and he wrote pamphlets setting
forth his doctrine of freedom. "The Soveraigne, originall, and
foundation of civill power lies in the People . . ." so that they
"may erect and establish what forme of Government seemes
to them most meete for their civill condition." Governments
"have no more power, nor for no longer time, than the . . .
people consenting and agreeing shall betrust them with." "God
requireth not an uniformity of Religion to be inacted and
inforced in any civill state; which inforced uniformity (sooner
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or later) is the greatest occasion of civill Warre, ravishing of
conscience, persecution of Christ Jesus in his servants, and of
the hypocrisie and the destruction of millions of souls." A
decade and a half later he looked back with pride on the main
achievements of his experiment. "We have long drunk of the
cup of as great liberties as any people we can hear of under
the whole heaven . . . we have sitten quiet and dry from
the streams of blood spilt by that war in our native Country."
The New World supplied an environment favorable to
democracy. Residents of frontier towns, even in the most con-
servative colonies, made effective demands for political partici-
pation in the central governments. Those persons whose religi-
ous and political demands were too radical to be tolerated did not
have to go back where they came from; there were other places
to go in America. Almost everywhere there were determined
minorities, and the growth of freedom in America soon got
strongly under way. At the turn from the first to the second
colonial century, there was John Wise, able and racy pastor
at Ipswich, Massachusetts, of whom we have almost no records,
except on the occasions when he was fighting in some liberal
cause-for repeal of taxes levied without representation, for
greater autonomy for the separate churches, for innoculation
against smallpox, for a fairer currency system. Two pamphlets
by him set forth as comprehensive and learned a defence of
democracy and liberalism as we have ever had in America.
He was leader in a remonstrance against the witchcraft prose-
cutions and later in a petition to the legislature to clear the
names of those who had been convicted. Even Judge Sewall,
who had played a leading part in the trying and sentencing to
death of nineteen of the victims of those prosecutions, an-
nounced, five years later, that the whole matter had been prey-
ing on his mind and publicly made acknowledgment of his
error. The legislature appointed a fast day in apology for the
tragic events, and the twelve jurymen signed a statement ask-
ing forgiveness. It was about that time that Cotton Mather
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wrote that "many juditious persons" had come to the conclu-
sion that Roger Williams had had "the root of the matter in
him."'
II.
What has been our record since these divergent and uncer-
tain yet generally valiant and idealistic beginnings? The story
has continued to be confused. We have sometimes followed
one tradition and sometimes another.
We held on to narrow suffrage qualifications until well
into the nineteenth century. Most of the Southern states still,
through one device or another, exclude most Negroes from
voting; and there are other familiar limitations, legal and
illegal, on political democracy.
Our record on economic freedom has been peculiarly mixed
and blurred. Most of us have continued to profess our ardent
faith in what we call a system of private enterprise and yet to
show very little active concern over its progressive disappear-
ance during the last century. I suppose it can fairly be said
that early in our history we became a nation predominantly of
individual owners of productive property and that that is a
genuine system of private enterprise. Moreover, the notion
that ownership of the properties upon which one works is an
essential factor of genuine liberty and that government ought
to protect and foster that sort of ownership, has been a familiar,
often dominant, idea in our traditional- political discussions.
Our governmental policy has sometimes tended to fortify that
sort of ownership. Sometimes it has had the opposite tendency.
When Alexander Hamilton got in motion a policy of federal
I The colonial writings quoted in the foregoing paragraphs are as follows:
John Winthrop, A Modell of Christian Charity (a lecture delivered aboard
ship on the voyage to America in 1630), and Life and Letters of John Win-
throp, by Robert C. Winthrop; John Cotton, A Letter from Mr. Cotton to
Lord Say and Seal in the Year 1636; William Hubbard, The Happiness of
a People in the Wisdome of the Rulers Directing and in the Obedience of
their Bretheren Attending (1676); Nathaniel Ward, The Simple Cobler of
Aggawam (1645); Cotton Mather, Magnalia Christi Americana (1 70z);
Rev. John White, Planter's Plea (1630) ; Roger Williams, The Bloudy Tenent
of Persecution (1644), and a "Letter to Lord Vane" (1654).
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governmental aid and regulation to foster the development of
large scale industry, commerce, and finance in this country,
other political leaders opposed his policy because they believed
that industrialization would transform the country from a
nation of free property owners into a nation of economic
dependents. Our actual economic development has been gen-
erally as Jefferson, Madison, and Taylor predicted. Familiar
technological, social, and political changes have made it increas-
ingly difficult for the individual enterpriser to survive in most
fields of economic enterprise. Most of us today work, not on
our own lands or with our own tools and materials, but with
lands, materials, and instruments owned by others. We have
become a nation mainly of employees and tenants rather than
owners. If it is true, as many of our ancestors believed, that
individual ownership of the productive property on which one
works is essential to economic freedom, then we have lost that
freedom, perhaps irrevocably.
How have we fared in our rights before the courts and in
our spiritual and intellectual liberties? Some of our ablest
intellectual leaders have urged us to pay more attention to an
orderly, stable, rightly guided and disciplined community than
to individual equality and freedom of inquiry. John Adams,
Alexander Hamilton, Fisher Ames, Daniel Webster, Hugh
Legar6, and many lesser men, have warned us against inno-
vation, speculation, and a too lavish challenging of the decisions
of our betters or superiors or even of a majority of our equals.
"Government," said Ames, "does not subsist by making prose-
lytes to sound reasons or by compromise and arbitration with
its members; but by the power of the community compelling
the obedience of individuals."2
We have frequently acted on such principles, sometimes
with no very noble or public-spirited motive. Just seven years
after we had adopted the First Amendment, forbidding Con-
2 A Letter of "Lucius Junius Brutus" (1786), in Works of Fisher Ames
(1854), vol. II, p. 95.
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gress to make any law "abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press," Congress enacted the famous "Sedition Act" of
1798, punishing persons who combined to oppose or impede
the operation of governmental measures, or who uttered or
published false, scandalous, and malicious sentiments tending
to bring the government or its officers into disrepute or to
excite hatred of the people of the United States. The act was
vigorously applied, and several opposition editors were jailed
or heavily fined, even though they had advocated no violence
in their vigorous criticism of governmental policy. There are
many later manifestations of our capacity for intolerance: anti-
foreign, anti-Catholic, anti-Semitic movements; discriminations
against Negroes long after the abolition of slaveryi court
injunctions against picketing or propaganda in support of
strikes; abusive enforcement of so-called "criminal-syndical-
ism" statutesi the Sacco-Vanzetti, Mooney, and Scottsboro
cases; the Georgia, Jersey City, and other state and municipal
interferences with freedom of assembly.
On the other hand, Jefferson, Channing, Parker, Emerson,
and many others of our statesmen, philosophers, preachers,
poets, and novelists have proclaimed a liberal and democratic
faith; and our deeds have often squared with such professions.
By the middle of the nineteenth century we had attained at
least the forms of a democratic suffrage; and now at last we
are beginning to rescue southern Negroes and "poor whites"
from the poll-tax disqualifications. We are finally awakening
to a realization that free individual enterprise has been dis-
appearing from our economic system and we are trying to devise
ways to restore some of it. We abolished all state-supported
churches soon after the Revolution. The Sedition Act of 1798
aroused such defiant denunciation that it was soon repealed.
Indeed the two most active agitators against the act (Jefferson
and Madison) became our next two Presidents, and a third
prominent protestor, Marshall, was our next Chief Justice. We
have admitted millions of persons fleeing from political, religi-
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ous, and racial discrimination and oppression in foreign lands.
We have removed many of the restraints on labor organiza-
tions. Mooney and some of the Scottsboro boys have been
freed. Private groups, such as the American Civil Liberties
Union and the Ohio League for Constitutional Rights, have
rendered valuable moral prodding and practical aid in behalf
of civil rights. We have usually had a vigorous discussion of
public affairs and free criticism of public officials. I believe
that, with all the setbacks, our main trend has been in a liberal
direction.
III.
Under what conditions, or in what sorts of times, are our
rights before the courts and our freedom of speech, the press,
and assembly most likely to be violated, by public authorities
or by private individuals or groups, with the connivance of
government? Three sorts of conditions are usually considered
to be particularly unfavorable to the maintenance of civil rights:
namely, those of war; of prolonged disputes between capital
and labor; and of extensive governmental regulation of
economic life.
War, it is said, creates conditions unfavorable to a sturdy
respect for civil liberties. An inescapable obligation of a gov-
ernment is to keep a country safe from attack or defeat, and,
to that end, to keep itself from destruction. In time of war
these ends often appear to require a vigor, speed, and direct-
ness of action not normally required for the efficient discharge
of peacetime duties of governments. So all governments, even
the most democratic and liberal, usually suspend, for the dura-
tion of a war, some of the familiar judicial guarantees and the
ordinary liberties of expression and association. War also seems
to create an atniosphere generally favorable to the making of
decisions on emotional rather than on rational grounds.
What has actually happened to our civil liberties when we
have been at war? We have done some surprising things, both
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in our tolerance and in our intolerance. Nothing happened to
Daniel Webster when, while we were in the most critical period
of the War of 18 12, he denounced our government for having
undertaken the war at all. Nothing happened to Abraham
Lincoln when, as a representative in Congress, he denounced
President Polk for having recklessly led us into the Mexican
War.
What happened at the time of the Civil War, when Lincoln
himself was deciding our policy? Several months before war
began legally the President declared that he was faced by a
movement "too powerful to be suppressed" by the ordinary
processes of government, and he made it plain that he would
not be restrained by the usual constitutional guarantees. With-
out statutory authority, he raised a volunteer army, added to
the regular army, paid out unappropriated funds, excluded cer-
tain correspondence from the mails, proclaimed a blockade of
southern ports, and suspended the writ of habeas corpus even
in non-military regions. Said Lincoln, in 1864: "I felt that
measures otherwise unconstitutional might become lawful by
being indispensable to the preservation of the Constitution
through the preservation of the nation. Right or wrong, I
assumed this ground, and now avow it."' Many worthy Amer-
icans today believe that Lincoln did more than any other man
for freedom in America. Many of his contemporaries, even
among those as strongly devoted as he was to the preservation
of the Union and the abolition of slavery, called him a despot.
In the World War we prohibited the making of statements
intended to cause insubordination or refusal of duty in our
military and naval forces, or to obstruct recruiting and enlist-
ment, the sale of liberty bonds, or the production of the neces-
saries of wari prohibited the use of disloyal, profane, scurrilous,
or abusive language about our military forces or our form of
government, constitution, flag, or uniform, or any language
intended to bring any of these into contempt, scorn, contumely,
3 From a letter to A. G. Hodges, April 4, 1864, in Nicolay and Hay,
Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln (new and enlarged ed., 19o5), vol. X,
p. 66.
370 LAW JOURNAL- JUNE, 1941
or disrepute5 and authorized the Postmaster General to refuse
mailing privileges to anyone he believed to be using the mails
to violate the war acts. We imprisoned nearly a thousand per-
sons under these acts and subjected others to the serious
ignominy or inconvenience of indictment or arrest. We interned
some 2,ooo enemy aliens and arrested or searched a good many
aliens and citizens without warrant.
Before we reach any thoroughly gloomy conclusions as to
what happens to our freedom in time of war we should note
some of the things that we did not do in our previous wars.
We did not set up any general censorship of the press and we
permitted widespread criticism of the conduct, and often also
of the aims, of the wars. We had no general internment of
enemy aliens during the World War5 and persons accused of
violations of the war statutes were tried before the regular
courts and according to the regular judicial procedure; most of
the persons accused were released on bail while awaiting trial or
the outcome of appeals to higher courts, and some of them
continued while out on bail to do the deeds for which they had
been convicted or indicted. We had, in the last war, less free-
dom than we ought to have had; but we had more than the
other belligerents allowed, and considerably more than the
post-war dictatorships have allowed even in times of peace. It
seems to me a careless exaggeration to say that war transforms
our democracy into a dictatorship.
In times of bitter conflict between employers and working-
men, the attacks on freedom have come from both sides. Com-
pany guards have assaulted, kidnaped, and even slain strikers
or unionizers; employers have until recently found it fairly
easy to get court injunctions restraining peaceful agitation by
strikers; city police have sometimes supported employers by
violently handling the demonstrating workers (as in the
Republic Steel Strike in South Chicago in 1937); municipal
authorities (e.g. the Hague regime in Jersey City) have sup-
pressed labor meetings. On the workers' side, the strikers have
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used clubs and brickbats against strike-breakers, destroyed com-
pany property, carried on sit-down strikes, and engaged in
other forms of workingmen's violence.
Finally, it is said that extensive governmental regulation
and aid in economic affairs is almost certain to result in sub-
stantial governmental interference with civil liberties: if you
curtail freedom of the market you curtail other forms of free-
dom5 planning means coercion; a managed economy means a
managed and censored opinion.
If that is so, then our future seems dark; for no important
political group now has any plan for a substantial withdrawal
from our present intervention. It is true that opposition plat-
forms and speeches have continually, since the early days of
the New Deal, condemned the "relentless expansion" of gov-
ernmental power over the lives of farmers, industrial workers,
and business men, and have demanded the re-establishment of
"former liberties." Yet in 1936 the Republican party chose
as its keynote speaker a Senator (Steiwer) who had voted for
nearly all the major New Deal measures-the N.R.A., A.A.A.,
T.V.A., N.L.R.A., securities-and-exchange, farm-moratorium,
railway-pension, and social-security acts. The Republican floor
leader in the Senate (McNary) had voted for those measures
and also for the utility-holding-company act; in i94o he be-
came the Republican candidate for Vice-President. In the
second administration of the New Deal, the Republican leader
in the Senate and the Republican floor leader and assistant floor
leader in the House supported the liberalizing amendments to
the social-security, war-risk-insurance, and farm-loan measures;
and the two House leaders voted for the Wages and Hours
Act. All the more prominent candidates for the Republican
presidential nomination in i94o warmly endorsed Federal aid
for old age pensions and unemployment insurance, Federal
restrictions on child labor, and further Federal aids to farmers.
The 1940 convention of this party enthusiastically adopted a
platform proposing the repeal of only two statutes (both relat-
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ing to monetary matters), and then chose as its presidential
nominee the candidate who had been most explicit in his
approval of the New Deal measures. Leading Republican
spokesmen have often said that the sweeping measures of
economic regulation and aid had been maturing for a long time,
chiefly under Republican auspices, and the New Deal just
happened to come along at a lucky time. Thus, fortunately
or unfortunately, we do not now appear to have a choice be-
tween one party supporting and another opposing an old Amer-
ican tradition (real or supposed) of narrowly limited govern-
mental activity in economic affairs.
Can it be said that one way of applying the economic aids
and restraints gives us collectivism and dictatorship, and an-
other way maintains free enterprise and civil liberty? Yes, this
has been said frequently and emphatically. The dispute thus
becomes one not about the scope of the government's action
but about the manner and mood in which it acts and the goal
toward which it is moving, intentionally or unintentionally.
Republicans and opposition Democrats have been saying or im-
plying that, without putting in jeopardy the recently enacted
program of reform, we still can choose between a policy which
administers the reforms in faithful accord with principles of a
government of laws and the maintenance of civil liberties, and
a policy which, deliberately or carelessly, throws overboard
these traditions of American freedom.
How genuine and realistic an issue can be made out of such
claims ? There have been two conspicuous forms of this sort
of attack on the New Deal methods and manners. The New
Dealers, it is said, have been so set on securing a speedy,
unvarying, and unchallenged compliance with their pet ideas
as to the specific ways in which their program must be carried
out that they have created new types of governmental agencies
and invested them with arbitrary powers of subsidiary legis-
lation and adjudication; and by such methods as well as through
their general manner of popular advocacy, they have spread
372.
FREEDOM IN AMERICA 373
moods of intolerance and authoritarianism that threaten the
destruction of ordinary rights of free speech and fair trials.
Obviously Congress had to create special agencies to carry
out the new regulatory measures. Each measure has required
a specialized knowledge and technique for its fair and effective
administration; the new directions and restraints are not aimed
at ordinary crimes or at criminally minded persons; and the
task of the new agencies has been to devise and administer
standards arrived at through continuous and expert investiga-
tion and supervision, often in co-operation with the parties to be
controlled by those standards. Accordingly, Congress had to
accord each agency a considerable range of discretion both in
formulating rules and in making specific orders to secure ob-
servance of the rules. The complaint is that Congress adopted
such broad and loose definitions of policy and made such sweep-
ing grants of powers of rule-making and adjudication, that
many of the new agencies have become independent legislative,
executive, and administrative agencies, all in one. In many
instances these bodies adopt their rules without public hearings,
and make their specific orders and decisions, sustained by severe
punitive sanctions, through a procedure lacking the safeguards
of an ordinary judicial trial; and their decisions are not subject
to review by the courts, except on grounds that a rule or order
goes beyond the scope of functions delegated by the statutes,
or that the decision is not supported by "substantial evidence."
The issue indicated here was vigorously but vaguely joined
in the recent debates on the "Walter-Logan bill," defeated by
the President's veto. This bill would have required the agen-
cies to announce the rules under which they were to operate
and to hold hearings before issuing rules and regulations
"affecting the rights of persons and property"; established
appeal boards within the agencies to hear claims by persons
aggrieved by the decisions, acts, or failures to act by any of the
agency officials; permitted any person to petition a Federal
court to hear and decide whether a rule was in conflict with
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the Constitution or statutes; directed the courts in such cases
to render declaratory judgments holding the rules valid or
invalid; and permitted parties aggrieved by a final decision of
an agency to petition the court to set aside the decision on the
grounds that the decision was issued without formal notice and
hearing, or that the findings of fact were not supported by
substantial evidence or were "dearly erroneous."
There are genuine differences of opinion between those who
approve a main trend in legal administration during the last
few decades and those who want to see that trend reversed.
The latter believe that both the routines of fact-finding and
the deliberations on rules, regulations, and special orders should
follow the rigid, formal, slow, and costly procedures of ordinary
legislative and judicial bodies. They believe that there are
real dangers, both of oppression and of inefficiency, in the new
and multifarious administrative definitions and rulings, often
made without hearings and changed without notice. The former
want to maintain simpler and less technical processes in order
to provide what Chief Justice Hughes once described (when
he was Governor of New York) as a "prompt, continuous,
expert and inexpensive method for dealing with a class of
questions of fact which are peculiarly suited to examination
and determination by an administrative agency specially
assigned to that task." The Walter-Logan Bill, its opponents
believe, would (in the words of the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York) force "administrative and departmental
agencies having a wide variety of functions into a single mould
which is so rigid, so needlessly interfering, as to bring about a
widespread crippling of the administrative process."
There have been grounds for skepticism concerning the
genuineness of some of the statements of this issue; some of
the leading advocates of bills to limit the New Deal agencies
had previously shown strong opposition to any effective achieve-
ment of the ends the agencies were designed to achieve. I
believe that moderates on the two sides are soon likely to come
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to agree that a considerable range of discretion must be left
to the administrative agencies in formulating rules and devising
procedures for their enforcement, and yet that some new formal
checks can be wisely put on arbitrary action by the agencies.
There may be an increasing recognition of a need for the
restraints; reliable evidences appear to show that higher and
lower officials in some of the newer agencies have been hasty,
prejudiced, or opinionated in their actions-perhaps habitually
so in some instances. Most of the new administrators, however,
appear to be acting with as much intelligent concern for the
public interest and as much respect for public opinion as most
Congressmen display, and with as much regard for lawful and
impartial judgment as most of our judges display. The real
safeguards against arbitrary and inefficient action here will
probably have to be found, not in statutory restraints, but in
the development of traditions of professional pride and judicial
impartiality, generally comparable to the restraints upon which
we mainly depend for protection against arbitrary and preju-
diced action by the courts.
IV.
What are the prospects for our freedom in the very near
future-as affected by our present governmental policies?
I have not reserved time for any discussion of the contentious
issue as to whether our prevailing foreign policy is tending
toward helping or harming the state of freedom, here in
America. Still, I should take my stand-and it is on the "anti-
isolationist" side, accepting the risk of our getting into the
war. That simply seems to me to be a risk less horrific than
the risk of a German victory. I do not like the expression
"aid to Britain." In the first place, I support an "interven-
tionist" policy primarily as an aid to ourselves. In the second
place, I should not care to aid a Britain I thought likely to
renew the international policy of Sir John Simon, which was
too much like that of Poincar6 and Tardieu in France. That
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has had the fateful impracticality of any non-idealistic policy.
I believe the chances of preventing a long restoration of such
a policy will be more favorable with Germany defeated than
with Germany victorious.
If we go to war, there are certain conditions that may
create, if not the necessity, a very insistent demand, for restric-
tions on individual liberty. Among the millions of naturalized
German and Italian citizens, there may be a considerable num-
ber whose sympathies will lie with our enemies; we shall prob-
ably enter the war with stronger anti-war sentiments than we
had in the last war; and we have had prolonged and bitter
divisions over issues of both domestic and foreign policy. We
are already partly prepared, wisely or unwisely, for imposing
restraints. We have registered and finger-printed all aliens.
The Federal Communications Commission has extensive powers
of control over communications by wire or over the air. The
Sedition Act of 1918 has been repealed but the mild Espionage
Act of 1917 is still on the statute books. We have new Federal
statutory provisions (in the Alien Registration Act of i94o)
for the punishment of those who advocate or encourage the
overthrow of our governments by force or violence or who
knowingly affiliate with associations or assemblies advocating
such action. Yet I believe we are fortunate in having now in
the most important offices in Washington men who have shown
themselves to be strongly predisposed against restraining civil
liberties. The Attorney-General and the Solicitor-General have
been emphatic in condemning the numerous proposals for arbi-
trary dealings with aliens and for censorship and espionage;
and the Supreme Court, in its present personnel, seems likely
to afford as strong a protection to civil rights as we have ever
received from that tribunal.
We have been debating some questions here at home, aris-
ing from our nearness to the war in Europe: concerning rights
of workers to strike in defense industries; rights of assembly
and discussion to be allowed to organizations (such as the
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German-American Bund) that oppose our democratic system;
and rights of Senators, Congressmen, and other public speakers
and writers to oppose the policy of the Administration. Merely
to make the issues dear, I shall state summarily some views
of my own on these questions.
I should not restrict the right of workers in defense indus-
tries to strike or picket peacefully, even by requiring a "cooling-
off period" before striking. I should restrain strikers from
employing violence against other workers or against the prop-
erty of employers; and to the extent necessary to restrain such
violence, I should afford police protection to workers seeking
access to plants in order to take the places of strikers. Those
who oppose police protection to prevent strikers' violence
against bona fide job seekers are either going too far in their
ideas on the extent to which the government must maintain
strikers' rights, or not far enough. If strikers' claims to their
jobs are unlimited enough to justify violence, or threats of
violence, against workers who in good faith seek to replace
them, then the government should remove all occasion for
the violence by adopting explicitly the principle of a worker's
property in his job and should directly prohibit employers from
replacing strikers. Finally, I should allow employers to speak
or publish their opinions in opposition to unions, when the
expression of such opinions is not accompanied by explicit or
implied threats of discharge or other forms of reprisal.
I see no reason why the "anti-democratic" groups should
be suppressed or how we can consistently do so in the name
of democracy and freedom. I agree with Solicitor-General
Biddle that we shall not "defeat the Nazi evil by emulating
its methods." I believe, however, that it would be no undemo-
cratic abrogation of the rights of such groups to prohibit them
from engaging in military drills or wearing uniforms or pro-
vocative insignia; or to require them to hold their financial
and membership records open to governmental inspection; or
to prohibit them from policing their own meetings and from
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manhandling or otherwise using physical means of silencing
dissenters at their meetings.
Finally, I see no reason why freedom to criticize the
domestic or foreign policy of our government, either now or
in war, should be suppressed. I see no sign that such freedom
is now being curtailed. It is true that we engage in a consid-
erable amount of irrelevant name-calling; and we should prob-
ably proceed better toward satisfactory conclusions if we had
less of it. Generally the speakers and writers who protest most
against the names they are called are the freest in applying
bad names to others. Mr. Lindbergh, who has in 1941 been
unfairly called a "copperhead," had in 1939 appealed to us
to inquire into the "personal interests and . . . nationality"
of speakers and writers who were advocating some modification
of our neutrality; and in i94o he had charged that those who
advocated a policy opposed to his own were influenced by
motives of "personal profit and foreign interest." Senator
Wheeler, another object of an intemperate reprimand by the
President, repeatedly calls his opponents "war-mongers,"
"American Tories," "Wall-Streeters," and "modern Judases."
I do not know of any time in all our history when criticism
from all quarters, directed against all sorts of officials, high
and low, has been freer than now: If anyone feels restrained,
I believe he has chiefly his own timidity or an abnormal sensi-
tiveness to blame. A timid person had better not engage in
public debate, even in a democracy. And surely no man can
rightly consider himself a martyr to the cause of free speech
simply because he may find that a majority of his fellow citi-
zens, having heard what he has to say, hold on to opinions
that differ from his opinions.
What of our future domestic policy, apart from the war?
There are many who believe that the present program of
economic reform does not go far enough-whether because of
its failures-not approaching near enough to any of its main
social objectives, or because of its successes-inducing demands
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for going further in the same direction. There are proposals
that we go on into a completer and more rapid and direct
planning of production, consumption, and the distribution of
wealth, and that in order to make the planning work we estab-
lish sweeping controls over banking, credit, and investment,
nationalize some of the great natural monopolies, and make
more thoroughgoing uses of taxation as a means of redistribut-
ing income. There are proposals that we turn the regulatory
efforts of the government in another direction-aiming at the
maintenance, or the restoration and promotion, of small private
enterprise--sacrificing efficiency for the sake of the benefits
and virtues we used to associate with a society of individual
property-owners-a society we had been abandoning long be-
fore the New Deal; in fact, abandoning even before the great
industrial and financial centralization of the Harding-Coolidge-
Hoover decade. Finally, there are proposals that our objective
should be a complex, eclectic, economic system, with the gov-
ernment adopting as its characteristic task the function of main-
taining a dynamic balance between various types of ownership:
small individually owned enterprises; giant private corpora-
tions, variously regulated by government; great public cor-
porations, like the T.V.A.; and private co-operative enterprises,
aided by the government. Any one of these three programs-
wider collectivist planning, restoring small enterprises, or main-
taining a balance among competing systems-would require
governmental restraints and aids that go considerably beyond
the program of the New Deal.
Let us now examine the contention mentioned above, that
such extensive economic restraints and aids by government lead
to suppressions of free speech and assembly and to abridgments
of fair trials before the courts. This has been former President
Hoover's favorite complaint against the recent legislation. "In-
tellectual and spiritual liberty," he says, "can be sustained only
by economic libert," and, for proof, he and others point to
the experiences of the European dictatorships and conclude that
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our course must be the same. The actual record does not supply
much evidence of the cause-and-effect relationship these critics
envisage. The totalitarian regimes in Europe-Italy, Germany,
Russia--did not follow governments that were over-zealous
and over-active in relieving distress and removing inefficiency.
They followed governments that had been conspicuously negli-
gent in facing the need for vigorous action to eliminate wide-
spread poverty, inequality, and insecurity. And our own experi-
ence seems to contradict Mr. Hoover's argument. I have time
for only one sort of evidence, drawn from recent decisions of
the Supreme Court, in cases arising out of complaints against
state or local authorities alleged to be violating constitutional
rights of a free press, free association, and fair trials. There
have been over twenty such cases during the last six years. In
only two of the cases have the decisions been against claims
in behalf of private rights: in one of the cases, the Court unani-
mously upholding the authority of a state university to exclude
a student because of his refusal to take compulsory military
service; and in the other the Court, with Justice Stone dissent-
ing, upholding the authority of a local school board to exclude
children who had refused on religious grounds to salute the
United States flag. In all the other cases the Court has sus-
tained the claims of the complaining individual. Thus it has
(in four cases) reversed convictions of Negroes where Negroes
were excluded from grand or trial juries; and (in another
case) reversed the conviction of a Negro who had been denied
the right of counsel. It has (in three cases) reversed convictions
secured by confessions obtained through third-degree methods.
In one case it has nullified the barring of Negroes from party
primaries and in another the denial of their admission to a
state university law school. It has (in seven cases) reversed
convictions for participating in the public meetings or distribut-
ing the literature of radical groups, or for distributing litera-
ture or holding meetings without permission of public author-
itiesi and in another case it has nullified a state statute aimed
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at the suppression of opposition newspapers. It has (in three
cases) nullified efforts to prevent peaceful picketing. These
decisions have been unanimous in over half the cases. The
only dissenters in the other cases-that is, the only Justices who
voted to sustain the governmental limitations on free speech
or assembly, or fair trial-were those Justices (Van Devanter,
Sutherland, Butler, and McReynolds) who had been the most
hostile to economic regulation by government. The Justices
most favorable to the regulation of economic life have been the
ones most opposed to the encroachments on civil liberties. Thus
our civil liberties appear to have been faring unusually well
during a period of unusually active economic regulation and
aid by government.4
I have not intended to close with a glamorous picture of
our freedom in America today. Democracy is not a system that
we can safely be complacent about. It is no halfway system-
a "Ccompromise"l or "middle-way" between left and right
"isms." It is still a radical doctrine, whose achievement still
demands the sort of courage and determination and adventure-
someness that brought our forefathers across the difficult
Atlantic to this strange country. The course ahead seems
especially difficult right now; and it is especially important.
'The two cases decided adversely to claims of civil rights violated are
Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245 (934) and Minersville School District
v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
The recent cases sustaining civil rights are as follows. In 1935: Norris v.
Alabama and Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 and 6oo. In 1936: Gros-
jean v. Amer. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233; Brown v. Miss., 297 U.S. 278. In
1937: De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242;
Senn v. Tile Layers' Union, 3oi U.S. 468. In 1938; Lovell v. Griffin, 303
U.S. 444; Johnson v. Zerbst, Warden, 304 U.S. 458; Missouri ex rel.
Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337. In 1939: Pierre v. Louisiana, 3o6 U.S.
354; Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22; Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268; Hague
v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496; Schneider v. State, 3o8 U.S. 147. In 1940: Cham-
bers v. Fla., 309 U.S. 227; Thornhill v. Ala., 31o U.S. 88; Carlson v.
California, 310 U.S. io6; Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296; White v. Texas,
310 U.S. 530; Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128.
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I believe that most of us, anti-isolationists and anti-interven-
tionists, recognize some sort of world significance in the fate
of freedom in America. We cannot easily escape a feeling of
our "ominous greatness, evil as well as good." In that sense
the metaphor Whitman applied to us fifty years ago--"Ship
of Democracy"--may now have a peculiar appropriateness:
Sail, sail thy best, ship of Democracy,
Of value is thy freight, 'tis not the Present only,
The Past is also stored in thee,
Thou holdest not the venture of thyself alone, not of the Western
continent alone,
With thee Time voyages in trust, the antecedent nations sink or
swim with thee,
Theirs, theirs as much as thine, the destination-port triumphant.'
'From "Thou Mother with Thy Equal Brood," in Leaves of Grass("complete" edition, Philadelphia, 1892, p. 348).
